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FOUNDING A COMMUNITY: GERMANY 
AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
Justin Frankel 
Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, the dream 
of many European statesmen has been to cre-
ate a common community in Europe that could 
speak with one voice in international affairs. On 
December 7, 1991, in the city of Maastricht, the 
capital of the southern Dutch province of 
Limburg, the leaders of twelve European states 
met to realize this dream. Four days later, an 
accord was reached. The resulting Maastricht 
Treaty was a series of agreements designed to 
bring political, economic, and social unity to 
Europe by 1993, and a common foreign and 
defense policy as well as a single currency by 
the end of the decade. While this treaty repre-
sented decades of work towards a common 
community, it was only the first step in the 
process of bui lding complete unity. 
Implementing the terms of the treaty became 
a tremendous task and a test of the abilities of 
Europe's leading statesmen. 
Yet the dream of the community has pre-
vailed through the revisions and ratifications. 
The strong foundation of the Maastricht Treaty, 
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anchored by the commitment to unity on the 
part of Germany, has kept the goal of econom-
ic, political and social unity attainable, despite 
the criticisms and doubts of many Europeans. 
These doubts arise mainly from concern and 
fear on behalf of Europeans that they will lose 
"their way of life, their traditions and their free-
dom to control their own affairs." (Fest, p. 51) 
It is these fears which have prevented complete 
integration in the past, and which have led 
European leaders of the present to construct a 
community which would preserve personal and 
cultural freedoms and traditions while allow-
ing for unity and cooperation as a whole. 
In this article I examine the Maastricht 
Treaty, looking at the steps that led up to the 
signing of the accord, the provisions of the 
treaty, and its problems. I also examine the role 
of Germany in this process as the European 
Community (EC) looks toward the future . I 
argue that, despite the negotiations, revisions 
and criticisms, the spirit of Maastricht has sur-
vived and the hope of a single European 
Community remains as strong today as it did in 
December 1991. 
Building a Community: Before 
Maastricht 
The idea of a united Europe can be traced 
back to the days of the Holy Roman Empire. In 
its modern form, however, it can be traced to 
Jean Monnet, a man who is generally consid-
ered to be the visionary and founding father of 
a united Europe. Although he never held polit-
ical office, his leadership and support for the 
idea of a European Community laid the foun-
dation for later federalists to build upon. 
Monnet knew that the process toward this com-
munity would be long, but that it would even-
tually be successful if given enough time. He 
once said that "the construction of Europe, like 
all peaceful revolutions, needs time: time to 
convince, time to adapt people's thinking, and 
time to adjust to great transformations." 
(Goldstein, p. 63) As the Maastricht Treaty came 
under fire, European leaders would remember 
his words. Yet Monnet's vision did not directly 
translate into the accord reached at Maastricht; 
a series of smaller steps were necessary before 
the dream of unity could be realized. 
One of the first steps was the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) established by the Treaty of Paris in 
1951. The ECSC was a basis for cooperation 
between European states on economic matters. 
In 1954 the European Defense Community 
(EDC) was signed and ratified by the ECSC 
member states. Although vetoed by the French 
Assemblee, the legislative branch of the French 
government, the treaty did provide for a 
European army with a common budget and 
common governing bodies. This was the first 
step in building a common defense and foreign 
policy which the Maastricht meetings would 
later expand upon. The various agreements 
known as the Treaty of Rome in 1957 provided 
for the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 
1958. In 1967, the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM 
were merged under a single European 
Commission that included a single European 
Parliament. The European Council, a formally 
established group comprised of the heads of 
government of member nations, was estab-
lished in 1975, and citizens of member states 
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voted directly for members of the European 
Parliament for the first time in 1979. This coun-
cil, although lacking any real power, was still 
important as a forum for discussion and nego-
tiation. In 1979 the decision to create the 
European Monetary System (EMS) was reached. 
Although the feasibility of the EMS was ques-
tioned from the beginning and was ultimately 
rejected, its importance remains because it was 
out of the EMS that the EMU, the European 
Monetary Union, plan grew. In 1987 the Single 
European Act provided the measures necessary 
to implement the Single European Market. In 
July 1990, European leaders convened in Rome 
to iron out the last details of the creation of the 
community. Their success increased the sup-
port for unity in Europe and, combined with 
other key factors, moved the community 
toward Maastricht. 
One of these important factors was the 
political leadership in Europe during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Europe's leaders were people 
inclined toward the idea of unity and were 
linked to each other through close personal 
contacts. These leaders also benefited from 
strong bases of domestic support. Former 
French head of state Charles De Gaulle's lega-
cy of commitment to a unified Europe provid-
ed the encouragement for later leaders to real-
ize this goal. So did the strength and 
commitment of Jacques Delors, who became 
the president of the European Commission in 
1985. (Mazzucelli, p. 58) Germany's strong sup-
port for a united Europe, articulated by 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was of particular 
importance. The determination of Germany and 
Kohl to reunify and integrate simultaneously, 
even in the face of domestic opposition, proved 
crucial to the success of the entire movement. 
(Bini-Smahi, p. 6) The unification process also 
benefited from a long period of economic 
expansion in Europe. 
International cooperation is always helped 
by economic growth, and the 1980s saw a long 
period of expansion in the economies of Europe. 
The strong economic climate helped smooth 
over disagreements concerning market share 
and member-state participation in the unified 
market. Europe's political leaders benefited 
from this growth because it gave them more 
room to negotiate the terms of unification, 
especially concerning the idea of the EMU. This, 
combined with a receptive intellectual climate 
within the business community, helped form 
the idea of creating an internal market which 
would facilitate cooperation and maintain 
mutual recognition. These ideas were empha-
sized by such leaders as then Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain. She advo-
cated economic deregulation and minimal gov-
ernment interference that furthered the idea of 
integration without compromising national 
sovereignty. (Bini-Smaghi, p. 6) 
So as Europe moved toward Maastricht, 
there was a clear understanding among 
Europe's leaders as to what steps were still nec-
essary in order to complete the outline for full 
unification. These ideas were embodied in the 
Delors Report, which described the EC not as 
an international organization, but rather as an 
arrangement to produce public goods for a 
group of sovereign states: the basic principle 
that was defined under the Single European 
Act, signed on February 17 and 28 in 1986. This 
top-down approach toward unification, one ini-
tiated by the leaders of the countries rather 
than by the citizens of those countries, created 
a clear legal and institutional basis for further 
steps toward political union and made the 
entire movement stronger. (Bini-Smaghi, p. 8) 
When European leaders met in 
Maastricht, they did so at the height of support 
for a unified Europe, and the provisions of the 
treaty reflect this cooperation and coordination. 
The Maastricht Treaty was comprehensive in its 
scope, dealing with all issues of Community life. 
By the time the accord was signed, a strong 
foundation for the European Community was 
established. 
Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
One of the most important provisions of 
the treaty concerned the creation of a political 
union. The goal was to create an area free from 
international frontiers so as to promote bal-
anced and sustainable social and economic 
progress. This would ultimately result in a sin-
gle economic and monetary union with a single 
currency for all members of the Union. The 
common market and single currency issues 
have taken the spotlight as of late, but there are 
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other provisions of the treaty that are just as 
important to complete integration. It is on these 
other provisions that I would like to focus first. 
Maastricht contained provisions for the 
protection of the rights and interests of all cit-
izens of the Community, granting the protec-
tion of their human rights and establishing the 
conditions for acceptance of other countries 
into the Union. Citizenship requirements for 
entry into the Union were also established by 
the treaty. A legal identity known as "Citizen of 
the Union" was created and made open to all 
citizens of member countries. However, the cre-
ation of a European citizenry is more of a sym-
bolic nature, reinforcing the principles of free 
movement and non-discrimination already 
inherent in the original treaty. The important 
issue concerning citizenship is now more about 
making Europeans feel as though they are part 
of a community. The confusion surrounding 
Maastricht and the complex nature with which 
the accord was completed left many Europeans 
puzzled, lessening their confidence in total inte-
gration. To rebuild this confidence, The Union 
is currently taking steps to increase public 
awareness and participation by simplifying the 
treaties and making them and other Union-
related documents more readily available, both 
in hard copies and on the World Wide Web. 
A social policy was also established under 
Maastricht. Embodied in a text called the Social 
Charter, it was a commitment to the "promo-
tion of employment, improved living and work-
ing conditions, proper social protection, dia-
logue between management and labor, 
development of human resources with a view 
to lasting high employment and the combating 
of exclusion." (Lewis, p. 185) In addition, the 
charter provided for improvements in work 
environments for the protection of the health 
and safety of workers. As important as this 
social policy was, its impact was limited by its 
inability to impose administrative, financial and 
legal constraints on businesses, and by the fact 
that the United Kingdom initially refused its 
incorporation in the overall treaty. But with 
approximately 18 million people unemployed 
in the EU, pressure is mounting for policy 
reform. ( EU Homepage, World Wide Web) 
Of all the provisions provided for under 
Maastricht, the biggest disappointment came 
in the handling of the section concerning com-
mon foreign and security policy and defense. 
Europe's defense throughout the Cold War had 
been handled by NATO; but since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1989, NATO's future as a 
necessary force in Europe has been a subject for 
debate. NATO also felt that the EU member 
states should begin to take a more active role 
in their own defense. The problem was that the 
European Parliament was not strong enough to 
create a different system. Therefore, the dele-
gates at Maastricht handed over security and 
defense issues to the existing Western European 
defense alliance called the Western European 
Union (WEU) , and gave it the task of coordi-
nating the defense policy for the EU. Although 
an entity separate from both NATO and 
Maastricht, the WEU was to coordinate a new 
policy while respecting the existing NATO poli-
cies concerning Europe, namely those which 
dealt with nuclear forces. 
Creating common security, defense and 
foreign policies proved to be extremely difficult 
because of the issue of unanimity. Any actions 
concerning these policies would have to be fully 
supported by all member states, a feat which 
has not been accomplished on even relatively 
minor issues. There is, however, a strong foun-
dation for common defense in Article 30, sec-
tion 6, of the Single European Act. It states that 
"closer cooperation on questions of European 
Security would contribute in an essential way 
to the development of a European identity in 
external policy matters." (Feld, p. 424) This 
foundation was strengthened by the Franco-
German Council on Defense and Security in 
1988 which stated that "European integration 
will remain incomplete if it does not encompass 
security and defense." (Feld, p. 424) 
Security goes beyond military issues , 
encompassing also diplomatic, economic and 
social dimensions. This being the case, the goal 
of Maastricht was to create a security and 
defense policy with the purpose of creating 
national and international conditions favorable 
to the protection and extension of national and 
regional values within the Union. By all 
accounts, the treaty has failed in this mission. 
The Maastricht Treaty did not go as far as estab-
lishing a common foreign or defense policy, nor 
did it create a common European army. But the 
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fault does not lie with the delegates. Europeans 
are unsure of who should be in charge of their 
security and defense. In a survey in 1989, only 
46 percent of the EC public felt that NATO has 
historically acted in the best interest of Europe. 
Yet, only 36 percent want the issue of security 
and defense to be decided by the EC Parliament, 
and 30 percent want NATO to continue in its 
role as protector of Europe. (Feld, pp. 426-27) 
As can be seen, there is no clear majority desire 
for a common security and foreign and defense 
policy to be decided upon by the EC. 
Adding to the complication is the fact that 
eleven EC members are also members of NATO, 
and American influence in NATO is still strong. 
This caused serious constraints during the cri-
sis in the Balkan Republics as European inter-
ests clashed with American interests, thus result-
ing in a sluggish response by NATO. As far as the 
WEU is concerned, with only nine EC members 
and a constrained charter the involvement of this 
organization has been very limited. It would 
need tremendous operational and administrative 
expansion to effectively impact European secu-
rity and defense, not to mention the admission 
of more member states. (Feld, p. 430) 
With talk of continued support of NATO by 
Germany and England and the poor track record 
of European unanimity, a common security and 
defense policy is not likely in the near future . 
Considering the importance of America to suc-
cessful European economic integration and U.S. 
support of NATO, the EC leaders and citizens 
may be satisfied to have their protection pro-
vided by a NATO with increased European influ-
ence and participation, a policy which would 
most likely be welcomed by NATO anyway. 
The issue that received, by far, the most 
attention by the delegates was that of a com-
mon monetary union and the adoption of a sin-
gle currency. Considered the most important 
achievement of the Maastricht Treaty, the dead-
line for a single currency was set for the year 
2000. The treaty made the EMU an official goal 
of the EC and devised a strategy to achieve it 
and the institutional framework for its regula-
tion. (Fratianni, p. 7) Also agreed upon were the 
requirements for joining the monetary union. 
To join, a country cannot have an annual infla-
tion rate more than 1.5 percentage points above 
the rate of the least inflationary member states, 
and a budget deficit above 3 percent of GOP. 
(Lewis, p. 182) These were ambitious, but not 
impossible, numbers designed to ensure the 
strength and flexibility of the EMU once imple-
mented. The section of the treaty on economic 
and monetary affairs also set out the following 
agreements. First, the introduction of the sin-
gle currency would follow an irrevocable fixing 
of exchange rates in order to maintain price sta-
bility. Member states would also need a sus-
tainable balance of payments. The EC also stip-
ulated that the policies of member states be in 
accordance with the principles of an open mar-
ket economy with free competition. To manage 
this new federal economy, the treaty followed 
the suggestions made by the Delors Committee 
as well as provisions for the creation of a 
Central Bank. 
The Delors Committee had suggested the 
creation of a European System of Central 
Banks, the ESCB, with one European Central 
Bank at its center. In this respect, the monetary 
system of the new federal economy would 
resemble the Federal Reserve System of the 
United States. The committee also accepted the 
principles of independence and indivisibility as 
the key to the success of a federal economy. 
Under the principle of independence, national 
institutions other than the Central Bank could 
not share in the monetary policy responsibili-
ties. The Maastricht Treaty provided for the cre-
ation of the ESCB and one Central Bank at its 
center, but added to its responsibilities by giv-
ing it authority to conduct foreign exchange 
operations and manage foreign reserves , in 
addition to stabilizing prices and defining and 
implementing monetary policies. 
There have been many problems con-
cerning the creation of a monetary union, not 
the least of which have dealt with the strict 
monetary and fiscal requirements. They have 
become problems even for core members such 
as France and Germany. Despite these eco-
nomic problems, the deadline for EMU by the 
year 2000 remains in place; but even Germany 
is now admitting that this deadline may not be 
feasible . The reason for this is that economic 
growth has slowed, preventing many countries 
from meeting the economic criteria for joining 
the monetary union. Beyond these immediate 
threats to the monetary union, there are other 
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issues which impact the feasibility of one cur-
rency for Europe. To begin with, by placing con-
trol of the currency in a central bank, states lose 
their sovereignty with respect to fiscal and 
monetary planning. In addition, since the 
economies of several states would affect the 
value of the single currency, trading against the 
dollar or yen would be difficult. 
Ratification and Domestic Support: 
Was Maastricht Good Enough ? 
Although the delegates at Maastricht were 
careful to devise an agreement that could 
receive complete acceptance, political, social 
and economic problems throughout Europe 
made the ratification process a problem. As a 
result, problems with the treaty began to sur-
face. One of the problems was that during the 
signing of the accord, Europe was experiencing 
a mood of "Europhoria" (Goldstein, p. 54), and 
the twelve nation states of the EC were in a peri-
od of economic boom. This feeling was quickly 
replaced by confusion and fear as to the impact 
of Maastricht on the day-to-day lives of 
Europeans. The negotiations which were nec-
essary to reach agreement at Maastricht also 
had the effect of making the end result "almost 
entirely devoid of meaning." (Fest, p. 56) 
The EC was unable to keep the same cohe-
sion which had led to Maastricht earlier because 
the economies of the twelve member states 
were entering into a period of stagnation. There 
were divisions between the strong and weak 
economies of Europe, and the trade wars 
between the U.S. and Japan were adding to 
these divisions. It was crucial to have the treaty 
ratified before any further progress could begin, 
but domestic ratification problems in France, 
Denmark and the UK were exposing an even 
greater lack of support. 
On April 7, 1992, four months after the 
signing of Maastricht, the Treaty of European 
Union, the new official name of the Maastricht 
Treaty, was ratified by the European Council. 
The vote was 226 votes for to 62 votes against. 
There were 31 abstentions. (Lewis, p. 191) Yet 
there were still problems with regards to cer-
tain issues. Many nations objected to the spe-
cial provisions given to the UK and to the inabil-
ity to agree upon a common security and 
defense policy. The most crucial issue was 
domestic ratification, and in Denmark the 
treaty was rejected in a national referendum on 
the grounds that the Danes did not like the idea 
of losing some of their sovereignty to the 
Commission, an unelected body. On June 2, 
1992, the Danish rejection of the treaty was by 
a margin of 40,000 votes (Mazzucelli, p. 66) , a 
narrow margin but one with a huge impact. 
This message was heard throughout Europe, 
and many people agreed with the desire of the 
Danes for more citizen input and less bureau-
cracy. Immediately, referendums were called for 
in France and Germany, but the European lead-
ers did not waver in their support for the treaty. 
Mitterand of France, Kohl of Germany and EC 
President Premier Anibal Cavaco Silva of 
Portugal reaffirmed their commitment by joint-
ly stating that there would be no renegotiation 
of the treaty. (Lewis, p. 195) As a result of this, 
the treaty barely passed in the French referen-
dum. In the UK, the House of Commons 
approved the treaty partly because of the strong 
case made for it by Prime Minister John Major. 
The problems did not end once the ratification 
process was over, however, for several issues 
were still unresolved. 
One issue was whether the Community 
should be widened or deepened. Widening the 
treaty meant the admission of new members, 
while deepening referred to increasing the pow-
ers of the existing EC agencies. Due to the prob-
lems of ratification, this issue was left open and 
is still not completely resolved. An EC summit 
meeting in Lisbon in June 1992 failed to make 
any progress on this issue, and the admission 
of any new members was put on hold. This 
summit also saw the five-year budget for the EC 
delayed. Heightening the urgency of these 
debates was the growing European recession 
and the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, all of 
which threatened the success of a federal 
Europe. (Goldstein, p. 59) 
Budget problems arose when the EC 
announced that from 1993 to 1997 the EC bud-
get would rise from $81 billion to $112 billion 
under the budget bill called the Delors Z. 
(Lewis, p. 188) Under the Delors Z, special 
attention would be paid to making sure the EC's 
resources would be equitably distributed among 
all member countries. A solidarity fund was also 
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established to help the poorer periphery coun-
tries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
meet their EC commitments, especially to the 
monetary union. This was met with some oppo-
sition by the larger countries, especially the UK 
and Germany, and affected the debate over 
widening or deepening the EC. The problems 
the poorer nations encountered in meeting 
Community economic standards demonstrated 
the price that might have to be paid for enlarg-
ing the EC and delayed any attempts to resolve 
the issue. Due to this, any admission of new 
members was postponed until after agreement 
on the five-year budget. The EC also stopped 
taking requests for new admission until the year 
2000, when the single currency is supposed to 
be in place. (Goldstein, pp. 60-61) 
Other related problems concerned the 
CAP, or Common Agricultural Policy. Projects 
under CAP receive half of the EC's total budget, 
or 1.3 percent ($85 billion U.S.) of the total 
Community GNP. (Goldstein, pp. 60-61) Most 
of this money goes to subsidizing the French 
farming industry so that it can remain com-
petitive in a European market where cheaper 
agricultural products will soon be available. 
This is seen as a necessary evil in order to keep 
French support for the Community. There is 
not enough money available to the EC to sus-
tain these subsidies for much longer, and the 
constitution prohibits the EC from running a 
deficit or borrowing money. Agriculture is not 
the only beneficiary of EC subsidies and pro-
tectionist measures. The steel and coal indus-
tries also benefit from community protection 
which the EC can no longer afford. The issues 
of subsidies and protectionism are at the core 
of the EC's budgetary problems. 
Beyond economic issues, the EC is also 
having problems with the military issues han-
dled in the Maastricht treaty. It was tentatively 
agreed upon in Maastricht that the EPU, the 
European Payments Union, would eventually 
assume responsibility for foreign policy and 
defense issues. Yet there is little evidence to 
show that such a cohesive policy is close to 
being agreed upon. This became especially 
apparent as early as the Gulf War, where EC 
members distanced themselves from 
NATO/American issues. The EC again showed 
its ineffectiveness with regards to Yugoslavia. 
Britain and France had very public disagree-
ments about the size and scope of NATO and UN 
involvement. At the same time, moves toward 
creating a common defense force, which had 
been stimulated by a Franco-German alliance 
to raise an army for the nucleus of the EC mil-
itary, were stalled by a general feeling in Europe 
that NATO could not be replaced. Germany and 
Britain agreed that a continuing U.S. presence 
"was vital and that the NATO structure be left 
intact." (Goldstein, p. 59) France opposed the 
move on the grounds that Europe needed to 
give up the dependence provided by U.S . 
nuclear hegemony. The issue of a common 
defense for a federal Europe remains unre-
solved, as do many others; but the key to their 
resolution might lie in the steps Germany will 
make with regards to the Maastricht Treaty. 
The Role and Impact of Germany 
The role of Germany in creating and main-
taining a federal Europe has been crucial. This 
is a role cherished by the country, as is clear in 
the words of Chancellor Kohl when he said: 
"Germany is our fatherland, Europe our future. 
The nucleus and basis for Europe's integration 
are to us the European Community, which we 
aim to develop into a European union. " 
(Feldman, p. 314) Germany's participation in 
the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty 
reflected its commitment to stability in Europe. 
Germany has served as both a model and 
testing ground for many EU policies, including 
issues of defense, monetary union, and unifica-
tion. German unification provided the first real 
test of the EC's ability to incorporate new mem-
bers regardless of their economic standing. As 
one observer has stated, the ease with which the 
EC handled German reunification "revealed its 
institutions' strength of purpose and capacity 
for adaptation." (Feldman, p. 326) 
For most of the period since the end of the 
Second World War, Germany found itself at the 
center of the Cold War, the dividing line 
between east and west. Since reunification, 
Germany has felt exposed to any potential insta-
bility in the region. (Brenner, p. 27) It is this 
feeling which has pushed Germany to take the 
lead in establishing a viable security and defense 
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policy. Germany has also been instrumental in 
planning the common market and single cur-
rency. Although many Germans were opposed 
to the idea of one central bank and a single cur-
rency, the leadership of Kohl persuaded them 
that a European monetary system largely based 
on the German model would be the best way to 
ensure economic growth and stability. Seventy 
percent of Germans were against replacing the 
deutsche mark with a new currency. (Goldstein, 
p. 56) Despite the fact that the German 
Bundesbank's tight monetary policy initiated to 
curb inflation and stabilize prices was hurting 
other EC countries, Germany felt that the other 
countries needed to reform their economies in 
order to ensure a successful union. 
Despite the differences among European 
states, the agreement by Germany and France 
to support the notion of a unified community 
remains intact; and this could very well be the 
key to maintaining EC stability. Mitterand, 
when he was in power, believed that this 
alliance was a strong foundation on which the 
future of the EC could rest. According to him, 
it remains a "crucial political driving force for 
the emergence of a political , economic and 
monetary union. " (Krause, p. 324) Just as 
important, however, is the strong leadership 
Germany has provided and is committed to con-
tinue providing. 
Yet, recent events have slowed Germany's 
economic growth to levels below the Maastricht 
criteria and have caused a split in opinion 
between the politicians and the population. 
Germany has adopted tough austerity measures 
in the past few months and plans on continu-
ing with this trend in order to meet the 
requirements for a single currency in 1997. 
These austerity measures include cuts in pub-
lic spending by 50 billion marks and other cuts 
in social spending. (Kamm, p. A1) These poli-
cies have been necessary but have also created 
social unrest. Recently, 350,000 people demon-
strated against these cuts in Bonn, illustrating 
how what is good for Europe is not necessarily 
good for Europeans. This scene is not limited 
to Germany, as strikes and union walkouts in 
response to deregulation and privatization are 
disrupting French productivity. 
Conclusion 
Europe after Maastricht remains an 
incomplete picture. The intent of the 
Maastricht Treaty was to create a federal union 
and give the agencies of the EC some of the 
powers previously held by member states. The 
treaty's goals were to unify Europe's strength 
through the EMU, which would promote a com-
mon monetary and fiscal policy so a single cur-
rency and a central bank could be created; to 
create the EPU to establish a common foreign 
and security policy so that the EC could speak 
with one voice in international affairs; and to 
give the European Commission authority to 
regulate public health, education, agriculture 
and the environment. Provisions such as the 
Social Charter, a section of the Maastricht 
Treaty, were also provided to deal with human 
rights, citizenship and worker's rights issues in 
a cohesive manner. While Maastricht was suc-
cessful in many of these endeavors, the single 
currency question remains, as does NATO's role 
with regard to European defense. In the end, 
the Maastricht Treaty left member states intact 
as sovereign actors, but forced unity in certain 
policy issues. The cohesiveness of the statesmen 
in the powerful EC nations remained intact, 
however, as political conflicts and uncertainties 
did not undo the progress made in the treaty. 
As for the U.S., a federal Europe will prob-
ably not exclude it as the uncertainties in 
Europe will force the EC to strengthen its glob-
al links. The commitment to liberalizing trade 
leaves the door open to possible expansion of the 
EC to include NAFTA and other regional trad-
ing blocs. Europe listened to President Bush's 
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warnings against limiting American exports 
(Lewis, p. 187), and it seems likely that the EC 
will adopt the trade agreements reached during 
the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. The 
U.S. is also supportive of the WEU's desire to 
take more responsibility for Europe's defense. 
In the end, Maastricht will probably be faulted 
only for trying to accomplish too much too soon 
and ignoring the early warning of Jean Monnet. 
For Germany, the period after Maastricht 
has been, and will continue to be, a time for 
proving its worthiness as a world leader. As Kohl 
said, "I am convinced that overcoming the divi-
sion of Germany will be a gain not only for the 
Germans, but for all Europeans and will deci-
sively assist European unification." (Krause, 
p. 308) The commitment on behalf of Germany 
to strengthen the rights and powers of the gov-
erning bodies of the EC will be a stabilizing fac-
tor, especially with regards to common defense. 
On the eve of complete unity and federal-
ism, the leaders of Europe who worked on the 
Maastricht Treaty have much to be proud of. As 
Jacques Delors said, "The community will have 
to take the lead in developmental aid and inter-
national action" (Krause, p. 313) to combat the 
problems facing both Europe and the world. 
Margaret Thatcher's vision of Europe, in which 
the members "increasingly speak with a single 
voice, where we work more closely on the 
things we can do better together than alone, 
where the concept that the community does 
those things, and only those things, which can-
not better be done by individual nations is rig-
orously observed" (Krause, p. 304), seems to be 
the realistic path that the EC must follow. 
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